[RwandaLibre] Rwanda: To what extent did the Hamitic Myth prepare the ground for 1994?

 

Rwanda: To what extent did the Hamitic Myth prepare the ground for 1994?

Hanno Brankamp
2014-06-18, Issue 683
http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/92163

Colonial era depiction of the Tutsi as a superior Hamitic race that
invaded Rwanda laid the ground for severe ethnic polarisation. This
myth resurfaced in the period leading to and during the genocide of
1994

'[...] it appears impossible to believe, judging from the physical
appearance of the Wahuma [Batutsi], that they can be of any other race
than the semi- Shem-Hamitic of Ethiopia.' John Hanning Speke, (The
Discovery of the Source of the Nile, 1863, Chapter IX.) [1]

'[...] I am telling you that your [Batutsi] home is in Ethiopia, that we
will send you by
the Nyabarongo so you can get there quickly'. Léon Mugesera (22
November, 1992, in Kabaya, Rwanda)[2]

Formulating scientific hypotheses about colonial subjects was a
concomitant objective of the European conquest of Africa (Van den
Bersselaar 2006). After visiting the Kingdom of Rwanda on his journey
to the source of the Nile, explorer John Hanning Speke developed a
hypothesis claiming that a 'higher' nomadic people had migrated into
the interior of the continent and had subdued its 'primitive'
inhabitants. In 1992, some 130 years later, Léon Mugesera, a staunch
supporter of Rwandan President Habyarimana, revitalised this claim,
inciting the country's Bahutu to commit genocide against the Batutsi
who he deemed an embodiment of those nomadic invaders.

Although this semi-scientific hypothesis has long been refuted, its
racist assumptions linger and play into the dynamics of contemporary
conflicts. This essay aims at assessing to what extent this 'political
myth' has nurtured genocide ideology and prepared the ground for the
systematic murder of Rwanda's Batutsi and moderate Bahutu between
April and July 1994. Most accounts treat historical misrepresentations
and racist ideology as a 'given' in producing the genocide (Gourevitch
2000; Newbury 1998; Hintjens 2001; Des Forges 1999; Prunier 2010).
Although the present paper concurs with these views, it seeks to
challenge the 'conventional wisdom' on three accounts. First,
explaining current political realities through colonial-era myths,
without considering ruptures or diverging developments, is bound to
deliver biased results. Second, reiterating ideology as the
socio-psychological force behind the genocide trivialises the legal
and ethical responsibilities of individual perpetrators.

Third, treating the 'Hamitic Hypothesis' as a unique Rwandan
phenomenon runs the risk of ignoring comparative case studies which
can foster a more thorough understanding of the country's particular
path to violence. To advance these arguments, the essay will proceed
in the following manner. First, it will discuss theories on the social
construction of antagonistic identities and trace back the origins of
the 'Hamitic Hypothesis', while outlining some of its contradictory
historical developments and claims. In a second step, these insights
will benefit the discussion on the hypothesis as a recurrent
propagandistic tool that shapes public opinion through the media and
eventually influences the actions of perpetrators. Here, some
alternative views on the impact of the myth will be discussed. Last,
the author will make some concluding remarks about the significance of
the myth in preparing genocidal violence.

'HAMITIC HYPOTHESIS' AND IDENTITIES: FORMULATIONS, HISTORIES AND DEBATES

While the Nazi's 'final solution' (Endlösung) became conceivable
through the deep-rooted anti-Semitism in European societies (Brustein
& King 2004), Rwanda's genocidal violence could arguably thrive on an
ideology known as the 'Hamitic Hypothesis'. The hypothesis attributes
any technological or cultural achievement in Africa to the influence
of a superior 'northern' race, most likely from ancient Egypt or
Ethiopia, as 'Africans' were categorically deemed void of civilisation
(Prunier 2010, 7). Europeans regarded Rwanda's Batutsi as the
descendants of those nomadic invaders who supposedly subdued their
more 'primitive' African neighbours (i.e. the Bahutu) (Mamdani 2001,
82). Right from its inception, the hypothesis was more than a
theoretical construct, but rather an 'ideological statement, a myth
motivating actions' (Rekdal 1998, 17). Its underlying assumption - the
dependency of African cultures on a more advanced deus ex machina -
put Europeans in a good position to justify their mission
civilisatrice and the colonial project at large. To properly capture
this ideological genesis, a brief historical account is necessary.

Early expeditions to Africa were inspired by modernist and empiricist
exploratory zeal, whereas indigenous people were categorised according
to scientific racism (Uvin 1997, 95; see e.g. Seligman 1930).
Expecting a continent of 'savages', German explorer Count von Götzen
was bewildered when he discovered sophisticated socio-political
structures and a monarchic-hierarchical 'state' on his arrival in
Rwanda in 1894 (Von Götzen 1895, 156; Schmuhl 2000, 311). His
travelogue, though exemplary for contemporary racist beliefs, conveys
the zeitgeist which reaffirmed the conviction that 'everything of
value ever found in Africa was brought there by the Hamites', a
supposedly lost branch of the Caucasian 'race' (Sanders 1969, 521). A
contemporary of von Götzen, German geographer and anthropologist
Friedrich Ratzel, subsequently formulated his 'Hirtenkriegertheorie'
(herding-warriors-hypothesis) in which he tried to prove the cultural
superiority of the Batutsi (among others) on the basis of their
nomadic way of life (Spöttel 1998, 131).

This interpretation of the 'Hamitic Myth' deviated substantially from
earlier biblically-inspired versions that had classified 'Hamites' as
'black savages', 'natural slaves', 'Negroes', and as the progeny of
Noah's cursed son Ham (Sanders 1969, 532; Rottmann 1996, 54). Sanders
explains these seemingly contradictory ontological claims with the
growing influence of the European Enlightenment, the declining
profitability of slavery in the early 1800s, and Napoleon's conquest
of Egypt which disclosed an ancient African civilisation that
challenged simplistic notions of the continent's 'savagery' (1969,
524-528). While previous accounts had legitimised the enslavement of
black Africans on the grounds of their supposed racial inferiority
(Spöttel 1998, 133), the colonial enterprise greatly gained from a
race-theoretical turn that distinguished between ordinary Africans
('Bantus') and higher-ranking 'Hamites', the latter epitomising the
notion of an alleged Kulturvolk[3] (a cultured people) with European
ancestry.

Belgian colonialists and missionaries in Rwanda granted official
status to this concept by institutionalising racial distinctions
between 1927 and 1936. The introduction of identity cards, and the
favourable treatment of Batutsi in education, politics and the
economy, effectively cultivated social injustices (Mamdani 2001a,
87f.). Pre-colonial Bahutu and Batutsi identities, that were mostly
based on status, occupation or wealth, were replaced by racialised
categories and enshrined in a colonial 'master narrative' that was
internalised by both colonisers and colonised (Jefremovas 1997, 96f.;
Pels 1997, 174). Hintjens notes that prior to colonialism,
'cross-cutting allegiances served to prevent the crystallization of
anything akin to 'ethnic' identities' (2001, 28). Making race the
master-signifier of belonging annulled those allegiances. Indigenous
identities began to compete with an externally-imposed racial
categorisation.

The 'Hamitic Myth' gained currency not only as an ideology for keeping
Bahutu 'in their place', as Des Forges (1995, 44) suggests, but also
for rallying opposition against a perceived Tutsi domination.
Mamdani's (1996; 2001a; 2001b) approach to colonial identity
emphasises political and socio-legal elements, such as histories of
discrimination and the creation of bifurcated colonial citizenship,
whereas Appadurai (2006) champions a socio-psychological understanding
of mutual 'Othering' that relies on the social invocation of myths.
Both explanatory models are inseparably intertwined, and shed light on
different development phases of the 'Hamitic Hypothesis'. By stressing
the functionality of ideology and 'fear' during various genocides,
Appadurai (2006) makes his theory generally applicable. In contrast,
Mamdani (2001a) traces back the specific roots of Batutsi-Bahutu
relations and puts the genesis of the above narrative into a local
historical perspective. Appadurai's thesis lacks this insight and
therefore fails to adequately grasp the Rwandan conundrum. Other than
in Nazi Germany, where Jews were neither historically privileged (on
the contrary), nor posed an objective threat to state order at any
point in time, the Batutsi had a history of dominating Rwanda's
socio-political life, although this was mediated by colonial law and
practice (Newbury 1995). However, both functional and comprehending
approaches are causally connected, especially where the colonial
imagery of a 'master race' was translated into actual legal facts. In
the process of ethno-racial polarisation, that characterised the
post-colonial period until the 1994 genocide, fact and fiction
indistinguishably coalesced.

Decades of racist colonial policies had left their imprints on Rwanda
society. In 1957, Grégoire Kayibanda pursued the transformation of
socio-political structures in favour of the Bahutu majority (Prunier
2010, 48). His popular movement Parti du Mouvement de l'Emancipation
Hutu (Parmehutu) sought to rid the country of "double colonialism",
both from Belgian and Tutsi rule. Both demands were formulated in the
so-called 'Bahutu Manifesto' of 1957 (Newbury 1998, 11). It stipulated
that Batutsi-Bahutu cleavages are the result of a 'political monopoly
held by one race, the Mututsi, [...] [which] has become an economic and
social monopoly' (Niyonzima et al 1957, 3, emphasis added). The
'Hamitic Myth' became the ideological basis for the 1959 'Hutu
Revolution' that abolished the monarchy and turned Rwanda into a
republic (Mayersen 2011, 171). As a result of the uprising, thousands
of Batutsi were victimised and killed, being publicly vilified as
'henchmen' of colonialism and proponents of 'Hamitic-feudalist' rule
(Mamdani 1996, 12).

Here, the hypothesis fulfilled two purposes. First, as Prunier argues,
the establishment of the republic merely equalled an 'ethnic transfer
of power', rather than an attempt in nation-building (2010, 50).
Others go even further and suggest that ethno-cultural
Hutu-nationalist propaganda aimed at the systematic social exclusion
or outright elimination of the Batutsi in order to create a pure Hutu
nation (see Appadurai 2006, 53; Mamdani 1996, 14; Hintjens 2001, 41;
Gourevitch 2000, 95). Distinguishing between the two objectives is a
matter of degree. While the first theory emphasises socio-economic
balancing and a shift in power politics, the second adds an element of
racial exclusivism which produces a Hutu "anxiety of incompleteness"
(Appadurai 2006, 52) that requires the extermination of the Batutsi
group.

On achieving independence in 1962, Rwanda's internal cleavages further
deepened (Prunier 2010, 55). Belgiums' strategic shift in favour of
the Bahutu opposition left the Batutsi isolated and vulnerable to
extremist violence. During Kayibanda's presidential years, structural
discrimination and indoctrination against the Batutsi remained common
practice (Newbury 1998, 13). 'Tutsification' of neighbouring Burundi,
after a successful military coup in 1965, further exacerbated
anti-Tutsi sentiments and quickly revived the parlance of a 'Hamitic
plot' (Lemarchand 1995, 60). Also the formation of the Tutsi-led
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in their Ugandan exile nurtured
resentments against a returning 'master race' trying to reverse the
1959 Hutu revolution and re-imposing its supposedly 'age-old'
domination over Rwanda (Van der Meeren 1996, 259). The spectre of the
'evil Hamite' was haunting the region again, but this time fiction
merged with actual fact, and whether it was the 'killing fields' of
1972 (Lemarchand 1989) in neighbouring Burundi, or the approaching
'Tutsi army' of the RPF in 1990, reality seemed to evidence whatever
'secret plot' the Batutsi were said to have made.

MYTH AND IDEOLOGY IN THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE

Due to the brevity of this essay, and a thematic focus on the ideology
of the genocide, other factors that have contributed to its unfolding,
such as the RPF invasion, the economic downturn, regional security,
the environment, and foreign state complicity, are deliberately
omitted, but have been discussed in-depth elsewhere (see Kamola 2007;
Cameron 2012; Newbury 1998; Reed 1996, Kuperman 2004; Magnarella 2005;
Uvin 1997). As in other genocide cases, the invocation of a 'higher
cause' also attached a specific 'meaning' to the 1994 Rwandan
killings. In Nazi Germany, Jews were dehumanised as a "cancer" or
"disease" to humanity, and thus their millionfold death in gas
chambers was portrayed as a "salvation" for mankind (Pine 2010, 58). A
similar rhetoric was employed by Serbs to justify the 'ethnic
cleansing' of Bosniaks during the 1990s (HRW 1992, 249). In Rwanda,
the physical destruction of Batutsi was euphemised as 'chopping
trees', and victims were pejoratively referred to as 'cockroaches'
(inyenzi) (Des Forges 1999, 62). As outlined before, genocidal
ideology necessarily rests upon a process of dichotomisation and
dehumanisation to justify the destruction of another group (Moshman
2007). Considering the above examples of racial propaganda from other
sites of mass murder, this point seems valid and coincides neatly with
Vansina's apt description of ethno-racial myths as the "handmaidens of
war propaganda" (1998, 38). However, myths and ideology are rarely the
causes of conflict, they merely perpetuate its deadly logic by
reconciling fact with fiction, grievances with 'higher cause'. Bearing
these theoretical discussions in mind, the question is which impact
the 'Hamitic Hypothesis' had on social and criminal interactions
during the Rwandan genocide. A discussion of the media is therefore a
useful focus for analysis.

While most killings were conducted by the interahamwe (Bahutu
militias) and units of the army (FAR), an ever-growing propaganda
machinery provided ideological guidance through radio broadcasts,
newspapers and public speeches. Although the RPF was responsible for
spreading counter-propaganda, a detailed discussion thereof is
precluded here by spacial constraints. In their broadcasts, the
state-backed Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) and
other stations continuously harped on the 'foreign' descent of
Batutsi, denouncing them as 'invaders', a trope which proved
particularly effective in the light of the RPF offensive
(Yanagizawa-Drott 2012, 8; Baisley 2014, 51). Kimani concludes that
racist radio propaganda "created an environment in which the 'Tutsis
of the past' and the 'Tutsis of the present' became the same" (2007,
112). By invoking the 'Hamitic' origin of their enemies, propagandists
could historicise contemporary animosities. To what extent this
ideology directly spurred violence is debatable. Yanagizawa-Drott
claims that over 51,000 victims can be attributed to radio propaganda
alone (2012, 5). Based on qualitative interviews with génocidaires,
Scott Straus criticises this view, stating that over half of the
respondents declared the 'Hamitic Hypothesis' was utterly unknown to
them (2007, 627). Considering the strong case most authors make to
establish a direct connection between racist myth-creation and the
perpetration of crimes (see Prunier 2010; Gourevitch 2000; Hintjens
2001; Des Forges 1999), this result seems surprising at first, but
supports the view that other structural factors were pivotal.

Print media was similarly ambiguous. Distributing propagandistic
newspapers, such as Kangura, proved difficult due to a relatively
small readership concentrated in Kigali (Chalk 1999). Kangura
instigated anti-Tutsi hatred in various ways, featuring treatise that
interpreted politics through a racial lens. In 1990, the newspaper
published a notorious pamphlet called the 'Ten Commandments of the
Bahutu' which, although not explicitly mentioning a 'Hamitic plot',
used language to celebrate Hutu-ness and to evoke solidarity among
'Bantu brothers' (Kangura 1990). Another contribution from 1991
explains that "the Bantu people [...] are fighting a legitimate battle
to free themselves from the tutsi [sic] hegemony;" (emphasis added,
cited in Kabanda 2007, 67). Again, the struggle of "Bantu people" is
an allusion to the imaginary 'Hamito-Semitic' origins of Batutsi.
Making these connections does not per se demonstrate the hypothesis'
efficacy in encouraging violence, yet it documents its persistency
throughout the 1990s.

The same is true for public speeches. Léon Mugesera achieved
considerable 'fame' with his 1992 appearance in Kabaya where he
threatened to send Batutsi (corpses) 'back' to their fictive Ethiopian
home land via the Nyabarongo river - a macabre vision that became
reality barely two years later (MoCI 2003, 23). Hate speeches of this
calibre, fuelling the fear of 'alien' domination, were commonly used
to spread genocidal ideas (Des Forges 1999, 68). Measuring the precise
effect of such rhetoric, and its translation into violence action,
seems analytically desirable, though unrealistic. Attempts by Straus
(2007) and Yanagizawa-Drott (2012) in this regard are ambitious and
promising, yet more work needs to be done.

The above examples arguably reflect the ideological tendencies
prevalent in Rwandan public opinion during the genocide. The 'Hamitic
Hypothesis' re-surfaced continuously throughout Rwanda's colonial and
post-colonial past and cast a long shadow on Batutsi-Bahutu relations.
By socially normalising contempt towards another group, and lowering
the inhibition threshold for denouncements, dehumanisation, and
eventually murder, the ideology played a crucial role in enabling
genocide (Vollhardt et al 2006; Moshman 2007). A key witness in the
ICTR trial against the publishers of Kangura remarked that genocidal
ideologies spread like 'petrol throughout the country little by
little, so that one day [they] would be able to set fire[...]' (cited in
Benesch 2004, 62). With media propaganda as a case in point, the
'Hamitic Myth' seems to have provided a superstructure that
rationalised mass murder. However, the following three aspects put
this 'conventional wisdom' into a more critical perspective.

First, the concept's adaptability to historical circumstances is
particularly noteworthy as it defies the simplistic claim of a
timeless European-inspired racist ideology. On the contrary, its
content was subject to substantial change and modification, depending
on the social climate or the political objectives of its proponents
(Sanders 1969). The RPF's advances during the genocide, or the
anti-Bahutu atrocities of Burundi's oppressive Batutsi regime have
been pointed out as catalysts for reinforcing prejudice and
myth-making in this context. Drawing simple comparisons between the
colonial construction of the 'Hamitic Myth' and its crystallisation
during the genocide seems methodologically flawed. Frederick Cooper
polemically criticises this historically negligent technique as
'leapfrogging legacies' (2005, 17).

Second, the insistence on establishing an immediate causal link
between racist ideology and violent deed not only runs the risk of
eclipsing the bulk of alternative factors that have contributed
rendered genocide possible (see Magnarella 2005), but also trivialises
the individual responsibility for participation in such crimes, an
issue addressed in more detail by Straus (2004) and Franck (2007).
Last, assuming the 'Hamitic Hypothesis' was symptomatic only for the
1994 tragedy overlooks the fact that Rwanda is not a singular case in
colonial-era social engineering. Rekdal points to the Iraqw people of
Tanzania who were first branded as descendants of Middle Eastern
migrants and were later declared as being representatives of a
culturally superior 'Hamitic' race (1998, 17). He holds that although
the Iraqw's self-perception and sense of belonging is inspired by the
hypothesis, a notion of vicious racial antagonism, as in the Rwandan
case, is practically unheard of in Iraqw historiography. Likewise,
during colonialism the nomadic Maasai were constructed in a similar
way, but the post-colonial Tanzanian state tried to eradicate such
racist legacy at the root, sometimes even by force (Mamdani 2001a,
47f.; Rekdal 1998, 29). The impact of racial politics on those groups
was rather different than on the Rwandan Batutsi, which shows that the
'Hamitic Hypothesis' is neither a one-way-road to genocide, nor a
self-sufficient explanation for ethno-racial conflict. Once again, an
in-depth analysis of local histories, cultures and social settings is
inevitable for comprehending myth, reality and what lies in between.

CONCLUSION

John H. Speke's contemporaries were convinced that Rwanda's Batutsi
were racially and culturally superior to their Bahutu counterparts.
Colonial policies translated this scientific myth into laws and
practices, thus establishing an order of racial favouritism that
privileged the Batutsi minority in socio-political life. Independence
saw a reversal of those roles, victimising the former protégés of the
colonial state and declaring them second-class citizens in a Hutu
republic. The 'Hamitic Hypothesis' proved a versatile tool for
justifying discrimination, defamation and violence, but also a
powerful social force in rallying nationalists around a notion of
exclusivist Hutu-ism, fostering the emergence of a "predatory
identity" (Appadurai 2006, 51) against the Batutsi. Seemingly
irrefutable, the hypothesis and its inflammatory ideological
assumptions survived in the catacombs of Rwandan politics, based on
fragmentary evidence and ambiguous historiography. Since its inception
in the colonial era, its ideas have strongly defined Rwanda's social
relations by fusing fiction and political fact, thus lastingly
poisoning the country's social climate. During the 1994 killings, the
ideological perseverance of this 'political myth' became evident as
its rhetoric resurfaced in media and the public space. Before this
background, the Batutsi-led RPF rebel army and the oppressive minority
regime in Burundi served as catalysts for a further polarisation and
escalation of violence. Other than in Nazi Germany, where the Jews
were never privileged nor posed an objective threat to state power,
Rwanda's past was an ambiguous space imbued with contested memories of
oppression and the fear of a collective 'Other'. Genocide propaganda
thrived on the interstices of these both real and imaginary grievances
and rationalised thousandfold murder.

END NOTES

[1] The e-document is available online, http://tinyurl.com/lpk8bl8

[2] A transcript of Mugesera's speech is available in Canadian legal
documents prepared by the Ministry of Immigration and Citizenship,

http://tinyurl.com/ltlwz6j

[3] The term 'Kulturvolk' (a cultured people) was first mentioned by
German philosopher Johann Gottfried von Herder who used it as an
antonym to the category of 'Naturvolk' (a primitive people).

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http://tinyurl.com/p8g77e5

(accessed: 19.05.2014).

* Hanno Brankamp is currently completing his postgraduate studies in
International Security at the University of St Andrews, UK. He also
holds a B.A. degree in Area Studies Asia/Africa from Humboldt
University in Berlin with a specific focus on conflicts and security
in Eastern Africa, including the Great Lakes and the Horn. He also
publishes on Think Africa Press.'

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NECESSARILY REFLECT THE VIEWS OF THE PAMBAZUKA NEWS EDITORIAL TEAM

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